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CASE COMMENTS
CORPORATIONS - Close Corporations - Strictness of
Requirements at Meetings of Shareholders and Directors. -
The courts, legislatures, lawyers, and businessmen are be-
coming confronted more and more by problems that are pe-
culiar to the "close", "closed", or "closely held corporation".
However, this is to be expected because the "close corpora-
tion" is probably the most prevalent form of business entity
in use in the United States.1
The first problem that one encounters in this field is in
arriving at a definition for this form of business entity. Our
comment deals with the "close corporation" as opposed to the
"public issue corporation". Our American "close corpora-
tion" is roughly equivalent to the "private limited company"
under the law of England. The "private limited company"
is defined by statute in the Companies Act of 1948,2 and is
as follows:
For the purpose of this ACT, the expression "private
company" means a company which by its articles -
(A) restricts the right to transfer its shares; and
(B) limits the number of its members to fifty, not in-
cluding persons who are in the employment of the
company and persons who, having been formerly in
the employment, and have continued after that de-
termination of that employment to be, members of
the company; and
(C) Prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe
for any shares or debentures of the company.
However, in the United States, we have not as yet arrived
at a clear definition. In the United States the "close corpora-
tion" is usually defined as a corporation in which the capital
is held by a few individuals, rarely changes hands, and man-
agement and ownership are usually vested in the same people.
The "close corporation" is distinguished from the "public
issue corporation" where shares are widely held, and, as a
1. See The Business Lawyer Vol. XIII, at 741.
2. COMPANIES ACT, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, C. 38, §28 (1). For an
interesting article on the European counterpart of our American "close
corporation see The Business Lawyer Vol. XIV, at 215.
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general rule, management and ownership are not usually
vested in the same people.3
American statutes vary substantially from each other, ex-
cept for those that have adopted the ABA Model Business
Corporation Act. Four states have, in attempting to cope
with the problems of "close corporations", enacted statutes
permitting "partnership associations with limited liability".
However, as a general rule, the lawyers and businessmen in
these states still incorporate "close corporations" under the
general corporate statutes.4 Lawyers have long recognized
that there is an actual and practical difference between
"closely held" and "public issue corporations".5 Therefore,
in the United States, "close corporations' 'have developed by
custom and practice rather than legislative action. In solving
the problems of "close corporations" the courts, as a general
rule, have attempted to apply the statutory and case law
developed usually for corporations with a different character.
Nevertheless, some courts have frequently recognized the
actual, practical differences between "close corporations" and
"public issue corporations", especially in permitting the
"closely held corporation" to depart from strict corporate
formalities.
A recent important South Carolina case, Freeman v. King
Pontiac Co.,6 recognizes the practical difference between the
strict formality requirements of a "close corporation" and
those of a "public issue corporation". The dicta in this case
should afford a useful guide for future decisions in South
Carolina when the courts are presented with issues relating
to the formality requirements of "close corporations".
King Pontiac, the defendant in this case, was a "closely
held corporation". In August, 1955, its forty shares were
held as follows: thirty-eight shares by Bray's Island Planta-
3. See 1 O'NEAL - CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE, at 81
for additional definitions of "close corporations" collection of cases on
formality requirements, and comments on formality requirements of "close
corporations". For a good judicial definition see Brooks v. Willcuts, 78
F. 2d 270, at 273 (CAA 8th, 1935). THE SOUTH CAROLINA BusINEss CoR-
PORATION ACT OF 1962, Section 6.22 (b) gives a definition to the "close
corporation" for purposes of that particular section.
4. See 34 N. C. L. REv. 432, at 456. Dean E. R. Latty, Duke University
Law School, comments on the "partnership association with limited lia-
bility" statutes of Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio.
5. See 33 CORN. L. Q. 488.
6. Freeman v. King Pontiac Co, 236 S. C. 335, 114 S. E. 2d 478 (1960).
This case noted in 14 S. C. L. Q. 13.
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ti6n, Inc., a corporation owned by F. B. Davis, Jr., one share
by Davis himself, and one share by E. L. Freeman. The di-
rectors of the corporation were Davis, Freeman, and. C. W.
Pratt. Freeman was also the vice-president, secretary-treas-
urer, assistant to the president and general manager of King
Pontiac, Inc. The by-laws specified that the annual meeting
of the corporation would be held on the fifteenth of July of
each year, at the office of the corporation.
Freeman was discharged by a newly elected board of di-
rectors for failure to obey a command of the president, F. B.
Davis, Jr. Freeman contended, inter alia, that the meeting
at which he was discharged was illegal because it was not
held at the office of the corporation, as required in the by-
laws. Judge Oxner said, inter alia, "This was a closely held
corporation almost wholly owned by Davis who was present
at the meeting. Under such circumstances, less formality is
required in holding meetings. It would be unreasonable to
hold that this meeting was invalid simply because these di-
rectors decided to meet at Bray's Island Plantation instead of
Columbia."
7
In the instant case, the court did not attempt to fit the
contention of the plaintiff into a pattern of law that had de-
veloped from corporate law in general; instead, the court con-
sidered the circumstances of this particularly "closely held
corporation", and decided what was reasonable. Furthermore,
this was not the first time that a South Carolina court had
tolerated departure from strict corporate formality. Thus,
in Industrial Equipment Co. v. Montague,8 the Supreme Court
affirmed a jury instruction that "respondent committed no
wrong if he cashed the checks and distributed the proceeds
to the stockholders of the corporation, who were also all of
its officers and directors, as salary or wages, despite the lack
of formal corporate action, directors meetings and minutes.
Formal directors meetings and minutes are not indispensable
to corporate action in all cases." 9 Here again we see the court
permitting a "close corporation" to deviate from strict for-
mality, and here again was a situation in which the court
could consider the facts and circumstances and arrive at a
decision based on reason and logic, not statutory and case-
7. Ibid., at 350, 114 S. E. 2d 478, at 485.
8. Industrial Equipment Co. v. Montague, 224 S. C. 510, 80 S. E. 2d
114 (1954). This case cited in Freeman v. King Pontiac, supra note 6.
9. Ibid., at 516, 80 S. E. 2d 114, at 117.
[Vol. 14
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law that had been developed to protect not only third persons,
but also stockholders who had no part in the management of
the corporation.
In most instances "close corporations" are formed because
the owners seek limited liability and, in some cases, certain
tax advantages. However, notwithstanding these corporate
advantages, the owners desire to retain certain of the attri-
butes of a partnership, particularly with respect to the for-
mality requirements. In effect, what they really desire is
an "incorporated partnership".10
In a "close corporation" where the owners manage the
enterprise, there is really no practical reason for observing
formalities, especially since formalities are required by law
chiefly to protect non-manager owners.:1 Moreover, un-
necessary expense and costly delays can be eliminated in many
cases by dispensing with some of these unnecessary rituals.
The folly of requiring such rituals was ably stated in a 1935
South Carolina case, Alderman v. Alderman,'2 involving liti-
gation over a voting trust in a "close corporation". It was
argued that the trust was voidable because, inter alia, the
trustees held no stockholders' or directors' meetings. The
court answered: "Looking at it from a purely practical stand-
point, there would seem to have been little occasion for hav-
ing such meetings. R. J. and P. R. Alderman after the trust
period were the only two legal stockholders, they were both
actively running the whole business, giving it their constant
and personal attention, were both present and engaged to-
gether in the same offices and probably hourly and daily
conferring with each other. Certainly the corporations have
suffered no actual injury by their failure to sit down an-
nually in a formal meeting or at intervals as directors and
call themselves to order and keep minutes of what they re-
solved to do at some special time. The corporations are func-
tioning, regardless of the failure to hold these meetings; are
being recognized everywhere as corporations; are being taxed
as such by the State and Federal governments and have rec-
ognition in all respects as corporations."' 3
South Carolina is not unique in its treatment of this
problem. In a New York case, Simonson v. Helburn,14 a sim-
10. See 59 YALE L. J. 1040.
11. See STEvBNs ON CoRPoRATioNs, at page 10.
12. Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S. C. 9, 181 S. E. 897 (1935).
13. Ibid., at 31, 181 S. E. 897, at 906.
14. Simonson v. Helburn, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 406 (1950).
1962]
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ilar result was reached. Here the court said that, "It has
long been recognized in New York that the directors of a
close corporation, when few in number, and in frequent con-
tact with each other may act effectively without going through
the useless formality of convening as a board."'15
In Shmron Herald Co. v. Granger,6 a Federal Court, inter-
preting Pennsylvania law reached a like result basing its opin-
ion on the principles of equitable estoppel. The court said,
"The doctrine of permitting close corporations to act in-
formally is recognized as an exception to, the general rule
that directors must act as a board at duly convened meet-
ings. The exception is founded upon principles of equitable
estoppel and is limited to instances in which the custom or
usage of the directors is to act separately or informally and
not as a board." This court in the same opinion stated,
"Closed or small corporations may act informally and proof
of their actions need not be confined to the formal minutes
of meetings but may be established by other means."'' 7
The courts have recognized the unreasonableness of for-
mality requirements in "close corporations" in areas other
than directors and shareholders meetings, minutes, etc. In
Kauffman v. Meyberg,'8 a California case, the court dealt
with stock certificates. In this case the founder of a "close
corporation" had bequeathed all of the stock in it to his two
children in equal ownership. The court refused to sustain a
contention that one of the children was not entitled to vote
his shares because valid share certificates had not been issued
to him.10
The laws governing the "public issue corporations" were
devised to protect investors as well as third parties. It is
imperative that the state protect those who buy into enter-
prises of which they cannot obtain an insider's detailed knowl-
edge, and must protect those who own such shares without
any control over the use of their funds. However, in the
"close corporation", the need to protect the investor is quite
different. Like the partner, he picks his associates and gen-
erally shares control of his money. On the other hand, he is
in a position where he must place his trust in each of his
15. Ibid, at 413.
16. Sharon Herald Co. v. Granger, 97 F. Supp. 295 (1951).
17. Ibid., at 301.
18. Kauffman v. Meyberg, 59 Cal. App. 2d '730, 140 P. 2d 210 (1943).
19. Ibid., at 739, 140 P. 2d 210, at 215.
[Vol. 14412
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fellow-stockholders. In "public issue corporations", the share-
holders must perforce put their trust in management - the
officers and directors who often hold only a small proportion
of the stock of the corporation.2 0 Therefore, formalities in
management have no utility in the "close corporation". In
Iowa, the necessity for a board, has been eliminated in the
"close corporation". 21 No other state has seen fit to go this
far, and this fact alone indicates that most jurisdictions
deem it more advisable to have less formality in "close cor-
porations" than "public issue corporations"; rather than no
formality at all.
The ABA Model Business Corporation Act permits in-
formal procedure for stockholders; however, the ACT does
not authorize any similar informal procedure for directors.
The ACT states in Section 138 as follows:
Any action required by this ACT to be taken at a
meeting of the shareholders of a corporation, or any
other action which may be taken at a meeting of the
shareholders, may be taken without a meeting if a con-
sent in writing, setting forth the action so taken, shall
be signed by all of the shareholders entitled to vote with
respect to the subject matter thereof, and such consent
shall have the same force and effect as a vote of share-
holders.
The North Carolina Corporation Law has sections authorizing
informal procedure for shareholders and directors. NORTH
CAROLINA § 55-29 (a) states:
Action taken by a majority of the directors or mem-
bers of a committee without a meeting is nevertheless
board or committee action if:
(1) Written consent to the action in question is signed
by all the directors..., or if
(2) All the shareholders know of the action in question
and make no prompt objection thereto, or if
(3) The directors or committee members are accustomed
to take informal action and this custom is gen-
erally known to the shareholders and if all the di-
rectors..., know of the action in question and no
director .... makes prompt objection thereto.
* 20. See 28 CORN. L. Q. 313.
21. See 52 N. W. U. L. REv. 345, at 397.
1962]
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NORTH CAROLINA § 55-73 (b) reads as follows: .
Except in cases where the shares are at the time or
subsequently become generally traded in the markets
maintained by securities dealers or brokers, no written
agreement to which all of the shareholders have actually
assented, whether embodied in the charter or by-laws
or in any side agreement in writing and signed by all
the parties thereto, and which relates to any phase of
the affairs of the corporation, whether to the manage-
ment of its business or division of its profits or other-
wise, shall be invalid as between the parties thereto, on
the ground that it is an attempt by the parties thereto
to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or
to arrange their relationship in a manner that would
be appropriate only between partners.
Connecticut, likewise, has enacted statutes permitting share-
holders and directors to act informally. CONNECTICUT §
33-330 reads as follows:
Any action which, under any provision of this chapter,
may be taken at a meeting of shareholders may be
taken without a meeting if consent in writing, setting
forth the action so taken or to be taken, is signed by
all of the persons who would be entitled to vote upon such
action at a meeting, ....
In dealing with informal action by directors, CONNECTICUT §
33-316 (d) states:
If all the directors severally or collectively consent in
writing to any action to be taken by the corporation,
and the number of such directors constitutes a quorum
for such action, such action shall be as valid corporate
action as though it had been authorized at a meeting
of the board of directors.
New York in its excellently drafted General Business Corpo-
ration Act also authorizes informal action by shareholders
and directors. NEW YORK GENERAL BusINEss ACT § 602 (b)
reads as follows:
A meeting of shareholders shall be held annually for
the election of directors and the transaction of other
business on a date fixed by or under the by-laws. A
failure to hold the annual meeting on the date so fixed
414 [Vol. 1'i
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or to elect a sufficient number of directors to conduct
the business of the corporation shall not work a forfeiture
or give cause for dissolution of the corporation ....
In authorizing informal director meetings the NEW YORK
GENERAL BUSINESS ACT § 711 (c) states:
Notice of a meeting need not be given to any director
who signs a waiver of notice whether before or after
the meeting, or who attends the meeting without pro-
testing, prior thereto or at its commencement, the lack
of notice to him.
It is readily apparent from the corporation laws cited that
the trend in enacting new corporate statutes is to extend to
"close corporations" authorization to act informally in their
management function.
The South Carolina Assembly during its 1962 session en-
acted a new corporation statute2 2 which takes account of the
problems and peculiarities of the "closely held corporation".
Many sections of this act are designed to meet the special
needs of the "close corporation", and some are specifically
limited to "close corporation", although others are not. The
SOUTH CAROLINA BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT OF 1962 in
authorizing informal action by shareholders and directors is
similar to the provisions to be found in the Connecticut and
North Carolina statutes.23 Section 6.18 of the Act concerns
shareholders actions and is as follows:
(a) Action taken at any meeting of shareholders, how-
ever called and with whatever notice, if any, is as
valid as though taken at a meeting duly called and
held on proper notice, if:
(1) All shareholders entitled to vote at the meeting
are present in person or by proxy, and no share-
holder objects to holding the meeting; or
(2) If a quorum is present either in person or by
proxy, no one present objects to holding the
meeting, and each absent person entitled to vote
at the meeting signs, either before or after
the meeting, a written waiver of notice, or
consent to the holding of the meeting, or alm
22. THE SOUTH CAROLINA BusINEss CoRPoRATIoN AcT OF 1962.
23. See DRAFT VERSION, SOUTH CAROLINA BUSINESS CoRPORATION AcT
OP 1962, Teporter's note at page 111.
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proval of the action taken as shown by the
minutes thereof. All such waivers, consents, or
approval shall be filed with the corporate rec-
ords or made a part of the minutes of the meet-
ing. The absence from the minutes of any indi-
cation that a shareholder objected to holding the
meeting shall prima facie establish that no such
objection was made.
(b) Action required or permitted under this Act to be
taken by shareholders may be taken without a meet-
ing if a written consent, setting forth the action
so taken, is signed by the holders of all outstanding
shares entitled to vote on such action and is filed
with the secretary of the corporation as part of
the corporate records. Such written consent shall
have the same effect as a unanimous vote of the
shareholders and may be stated as such in any
certificate or document required to be filed with
the Secretary of State.
Section 8.11 of the ACT in permitting informal directors pro-
cedure states:
(a) Action taken by a majority of the directors without
a meeting shall be valid if
(1) Written consent to the action taken is exe-
cuted, either before or after the action so taken,
by all of the directors and is filed with the
minutes of the proceedings of the board or
committee, or
(2) All shareholders have actual knowledge of the
action taken, and no shareholder makes prompt
objection thereto.
(b) If a meeting otherwise valid of the board of di-
rectors or of any committee is held without call or
notice where such is required, any action taken at
such meeting shall be deemed ratified by a director
or committee member who did not attend, unless
after learning of the action taken and of the im-
propriety of the meeting, he makes prompt objec-
tion thereto.
(c) Objection by a shareholder, director, or committee
member shall be effective only if written objection
[Vol. 14
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to the holding of the meeting or to any specific
action so taken is filed with the Secretary of the
corporation.
The reporter of the committee noted in the Draft Version,
2 4
"These provisions by their very nature are of use only to
the close held corporation which conducts its business with
a maximum of informality." It is expected that larger cor-
porations will adhere to formality requirements that have
heretofore been used. The new law recognizes and imple-
ments the rulings of the South Carolina Supreme Court in
Industrial Equipment Co. v. Montague25 and Freeman v. King
Pontiac Co. 2 6 dealing with the formality requirements of
"close corporations". 27 The committee drafting the new South
Carolina Corporation statute properly did not attempt to set
out specifically when formality requirements must be ad-
hered to. As was previously stated, it is almost impossible
to define clearly a "close corporation"; therefore, the courts,
rather than construe a statute, will only have to look at the
circumstances and decide what is reasonable. This flexibility
will permit courts to deal with reality, rather than trying to
fit a particular set of circumstances into a particular statute.
The vehicle for determining the necessary formality require-
ments of "close corporations" is the court rather than the
legislature, for only in the courts can we find the solution
for so many varied and different circumstances.
In short, one correct approach is expressed by the state-
ment in an Alaskan case2s dealing with the validity of direc-
tors meetings, " the court is governed not so much by degree
of formality observed as by practical and legal effect of the
action taken in view of the circumstance." 29 This view, cou-
pled with Judge Oxner's dicta in King Pontiac, supra, and
the "close corporation" sections of the new South Carolina
Corporation Act should eliminate the need for further legis-
lation in this field.
FALCON B. HAWKINS.
24. Supra note 23.
25. SupraL note 8, at 516, 80 S. E. 2d 114, at 117.
26. Supra note 6, at 350, 114 S. E. 2d 478, at 485.
27. DRAFT VERSION, SOUTH CAROLINA BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT OF
1962, Section 8.11, see reporter's note at 151.
28. Port Chilkoot Co. v. Heinmiller et al., 12 Alaska 200 (1948).
29. Ibid., at 209.
1962]
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TRADE REGULATIONS - How Not to Harmonize Sec-
tion 5 with the Robinson-Patman Act. - The Robinson-
Patman amendments' to section 2 of the Clayton Act were
enacted in 1936 to preserve traditional channels of market
distribution by restricting the buying methods of chain-
stores.2 The result of intensive lobbying by wholesale gro-
cers,3 the Act was an unhappy miscegenation between NRA
theory of protectionism and the general antitrust theory of
market competition. 4 Aside from its murky legislative his-
tory,5 obscure wording,0 and internal conflicts," critics and,
eventually, the courts recognized the basic contradiction be-
tween Robinson-Patman specific illegality and the more gen-
eral prohibitions of earlier antitrust laws, which permitted
a Rule of Reason approach to the problems of insuring eco-
nomic competition.8 The discord prompted Mr. Justice Frank-
furter to remark that "the policies directed at maintaining
effective competition, as expressed in the Sherman Law, the
Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, and
the Federal Trade Commission Act are difficult to formulate
and not altogether harmonious".9 Shortly thereafter the Su-
1. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U. S. C. §§ 13(a)-(f) (1952).
2. Rep. Wright Patman himself has remarked that "one certain big con-
cern had really caused the passage of this Act, the A. & P. Co." Hear-
ings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee on Bills to Amend the Clayton Act, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1956).
For a pungent account of Robinson-Patman origins, see Rowe, The
Evolution of the Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty Year Persective, 57
COL. L. REv. 1059 (1957).
3. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 1-53 (Brookings Inst.
(1959).
4. Rowe, supra, p. 1088.
5. EDWARDS, supra n. 4.
6. Rep. Emanuel Cellar, calling the Act a "hodgepodge," charged that
it "contains so many inconsistencies [that] the courts will have the
devil's own job to unravel the tangle . . . You have the herculean task
to make it yield sense." 80 Cong. Rec. 9419 (1936).
7. Stedman, Twentv-four Years of the Robinson-Patman Act, 1960
WIs. L. Rav. 197, 218 (1960). The author comments, "'the relationship
of subsections (c), (d) and (e) to subsection (a) and to each other, is
d hodge-podge of confusion and inconsistency that any competent, order-
loving lawyer must find offensive."
8. Mr. Justice Jackson highlighted the problem when he observed,
"We have vacillated and oscillated between the N.R.A. theory, roughly,
and the Sherman Anti-Trust Law theory ever since I can remember, and
we are still wobbling." Transcript of Oral Argument, Oct. 9, 1950, p. 49,
Standard Oil v. F.T.C., 340 U. 5. 231, 95 L. Ed. 239 (1951). In speaking
of these contradictory antecedents Rowe has charged, "the compromise
of 1936 was the offspring of a mixed marriage between antitrust and
NRA, born with a legal split personality." Rowe, Expectation Versus
Accomplishment, 17 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION at 301 (1960).
9. F.T.C. v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U. S. 392, 405-
406, 97 L. Ed. 426, 436 (1953) (dissenting opinion of Justices Frank-
furter and Burton).
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preme Court, through the same Justice, enunciated its "duty
to reconcile" the stricter Robinson-Patman Act "with the
broader antitrust policies that have been laid down by Con-
gress."'1 To the Attorney General's Committee the "duty
to reconcile" meant to resolve "every statutory doubt in favor
of the Sherman Act's basic antitrust directives... accommo-
dating all legal restrictions on the distributive process to
dominant Sherman Act policies."" That the FTC could aid
in reconciling the two was an optimistic suggestion of the
Committee. The FTC, however, has had other thoughts on
the subject The purpose of this note is to examine the Com-
mission's position in one area of Robinson-Patman enforce-
ment: What to do with a buyer who induces sellers to violate
the Act.
The historical anomaly of Robinson-Patman is that, al-
though aimed at the buying practices of the chains, its pro-
scriptions, with two exceptions, 12 were placed on sellers.'3
Far from attempting to reconcile this strict illegality with
antitrust Rule of Reason doctrine, the Commission has been
quick to exploit those sections of the Act which contain no
built-in defenses.14 The exempt buyer, however, has posed
a problem to the FTC. That buyer who induced or knowingly
accepted a price discrimination, a 2 (a) offense by the seller,
could be attacked under the troublesome 2 (f) ; that buyer who
induced a violation of 2(c) could be reached under 2(c) 's
own terms. But the 2 (d) or 2 (e) inducer was exempt (be-
10. Automatic Canteen Co. v. F.T.C., 346 U. S. 61, 63, 97 L. Ed. 1454,
1458 (1953).
11. REPORT OF THE ATT'Y GEN. COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS, 131 (1955).
12. Subsection 2(f) applies exclusively to buyers who knowingly induce
or accept price discriminations of the sort which 2(a) makes it unlawful
for sellers to grant. Subsection 2(c) applies to buyers and sellers alike.
13. Subsection 2(a), 2(c), 2(d), and 2(e) make certain specific prac-
tices illegal for sellers. Subsection 2(b) is a matter of defense available
to sellers who grant and buyers who accept price discriminations.
14. Rowe pointedly attacks the FTC on this point:
[A] quaint phenomenon has been the traditional fascination with
litigation statistics - what ex-Commissioner Lowell Mason calls the
'numbers game'. This preoccupation with scalps, rather than the
more permanent values of Robinson-Patman enforcement, shows up
in the startling rise of proceedings under the per so prohibitions
governing brokerage and advertising allowances (of some 319 Robin-
son-Patman complaints since October 1, 1956, 190 have been issued
under the provisions of 2(c) and 2(d).) ... Rather than symptom-
izing an epidemic of brokerage or promotional misconduct on the
part of business, I suspect the statistics indicate a Parkinson's law of
Patman enforcement - that complaints grow in proportion to the ease
of winning the case. Rowe, supra, n. 8, at 311-312.
i962]
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cause he was not included) under the express provisions of the
law. As early as 1955 the Commission devised a means of at-
tacking such a buyer. 15 In two recent cases that means has
ripened into judicial doctrine, blessed with the sanction of
a Court of Appeals. The Grand Union Co.16 and its compan-
ion American News Co. & Union News Co.'7 now stand for
the proposition that a buyer who induces a violation of 2(d)
has engaged in an "unfair method of competition" under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
These two and other similar decisions raise three basic
queries: 1) Should the four antitrust statutes be construed
in pari materia? 2) Assuming that they should, have these
two decisions so construed them? 3) If construction in pari
materia is the end to be desired, does the present interpreta-
tion represent the best means of achieving that end? Within
this framework the arguments of the proponents and the
opponents of the Grand Union doctrine will be examined.
An alternative (and more desirable) means of reaching the
same end will then be suggested.
To determine whether the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act,
the FTC Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act should be con-
15. United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6525 (1956).
16. The Grand Union Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Federal Trade Commission
Complaints, Orders, Stipulations, 1960-1961) 28980, at 37478. In the
Grand Union case, defendant, a chain store, agreed with an advertising
agency, owner of a "spectacular" sign in Times Square, that in return
for procuring advertisers the defendant could use the sign at a nominal
fee. Grand Union, by promises of in-store promotions or other preferential
treatment, induced some of its suppliers to advertise through the agency.
Later, the agreement was modified so that Grand Union gave up its ad-
vertising time, and in return the agency paid defendant 5% of the
amount paid by 3/4 and 100% of the remaining 1/4 of the advertisers
it procured. The hearing examiner found defendant's suppliers had
clearly violated 2(d) because they had given Grand Union advertising
allowances which they had not made available on a proportionately equal
basis to its competitors; that Grand Union knew the payments made to
the agency were illegal since the whole purpose of the arrangement had
been to avoid sellers' necessity to proportionalize; that inducing the
sellers to violate 2 (d) was an unfair method of competition.
17. The Union News Co., TRADE REG. REP. (Federal Trade Commission
Complaints, Orders, Stipulations, 1960-1961) ff 29335, at 37664. The
American News facts are slightly different. American and its wholly
owned subsidiary, Union, the largest single retail newsstand operation
in the U. S., coerced magazine publishers into granting. substantial re-
bates in the form of promotional and advertising allowances. This they
did by threatening to stop selling the magazines of the uncooperative
publisher. The examiner also determined that defendant was using part
of the allowances to out-bid competing newsstand operators for choice
locations and thereby to better increase its coercive advantage. There was
no finding that the publishers had violated 2(d) although a list of suits
filed against these sellers by the FTC was included in the report.
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strued in pari materia, it is useful to start with the "funda-
mental proposition," as one authority has put it, that
. . . statutes related to the common end of maintaining
effective competition should be construed together as;
interlaced expressions of national antitrust policy. This
canon of statutory interpretation, known under the des-
ignation statutes in pan mnateria, applies where, as here,
the generality of the standards of the Sherman Act and
sec. 5 must be accommodated to the specific provisions
of the Clayton Act.18
Those who oppose the attempt to harmonize the general
with the specific have done so at length too great to examine
here. What they propose generally is repeal of the Robinson-
Patman Act, on the theory that it produces price rigidity and,
thereby, price discrimination, in the economic sense of the
term. Considering the hypnotic effect of "small business" on
Congress, this solution is, at best, an unlikely one. It is
enough here to note that their arguments are legal,19 eco-
nomic, 20 and convincing.2 1
Although reconciliation of the four major antitrust stat-
utes ultimately may be the less desirable of two alternatives,
it is for the present the more realistic, as Justice Frank-
furter has noted.22 Then, to what extent do the decisions in
Grand Union and American News represent constructions in
pari materia, to what extent has harmony among the applica-
ble statutes been achieved? It is safe to say there are two
distinct schools of thought on the use of section 5 to make
buyers liable for sellers' violation of 2 (d). A majority of the
FTC2 3 and of the Second Circuit 24 have enunciated their
18. Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MICH. L. REV. at
823-24 (1960).
19. Rowe, supra n. 2.
20. Jules Backman, Af Ecoiwinist Looks at the Robinson-Patman Act,
17 A.B.A. ANTrrRUST SECTION 343 (1960). As Dr. Backinan points out
at pp. 345-50, "The Robinson-Patman Act does not deal with price dis-
crimination in the economic sense . . . [Bly tending to eliminate price
differentials, the Robinson-Patman Act creates economic price discrimi-
nation rather than eliminating it. This is truly an Alice in Wonderland
approach."
21. Edwards supra n. 3. This study is not only convificing, it is over-
whelming.
22. See supra n. 10.
23. See supra n. 16, 17.
24. Grand Union v. F.T.C., TRADE REM. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) 70224,
at 75.845 (2d Cir. Feb. 19, 1962). American News Co. and the Union
News Co. v. F.T.C., TRADE REG. REP. (1962 Trade Cas.) f 70225, at 75854
(2d Cir., Feb. 19, 1962).
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version of construction in pari materia, with the suport of
Professor S. Chesterfield Oppenheim.25 Dissenters on the
Commission26 and the bench27 have been joined by Professor
Milton Handler28 in deploring the majority view.
The construction the Commission achieved was one aimed
at a specific practice. The aim of Robinson-Patman is to
outlaw the abuse of purchasing power by large buyers. While
inducing price discriminations was made expressly illegal, the
:practice of achieving discriminatory promotional allowances
remained unprohibited through legislative oversight.29 In ab-
sence of clear Congressional intent to sanction such practices,
and in absence of direct conflict between Robinson-Patman
.and the FTC Act, section 5 may be used to deal with acts
-which come within Robinson-Patman spirit if not its letter.
'The Commission has the power within a given situation to
,declare a particular practice an unfair method of competition.
Tn applying the imprecise "unfair method" standard, the Com-
aission is not restricted to what has been decided illegal
under the Sherman Act30 or the Clayton Act,31 but rather
it must "hit at every trade practice" which would then or
thereafter lead to "such a restraint if not stopped in its in-
cipient stages."32 The very purpose of the FTC Act is "to
supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton
Act ... to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which,
\vvhen full-blown, would violate those Acts."
33
'Commissioner Tait and Professor Handler responded that
-the majority had usurped legislative powers by trying to plug
,a loophole which, they believed, Congress had knowingly left
,open. The Commission can, in their view, enforce only what
the statute proscribes; what the Commission did, on the other
hand, was to legislate a substantive violation of the law on
the theory that its omission in the original statute was in-
25. Oppenheim supra n. 18.
26. See supra n. 16.
,27. See supra n. 24.
28. Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YALE L. J. 75 (1961).
29. Dunn, Sections 2(d) and 2(e), New York State Bar Assc., Robin-
-on-Patman Symposium (CCH 1946), 55, 61.
30. F.T.C. v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U. S. 441, 66 L. Ed. 307
(1922).
31. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. F.T.C., 112 F. 2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
32. F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, et. al., 333 U. S. 683, 92 L. Ed. 1010
(1948).
33. See supra n. 9.
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advertent.3 4 Thus, any violation of what the Commission
deems the spirit of the antitrust laws can be arrested in
absence of statutory mandate. 5 Commissioner Tait attacked
the use of the language "supplement and bolster" on the
ground that it was drawn from and confined to those cases
applying the "incipiency" doctrine, which is not at issue
in the instant case. In order to sustain a holding under section
5 under that doctrine there must be an embryonic violation
of the Sherman or Clayton Acts as well as a factual conclusion
of probable injury to competition, both of which elements
are lacking here.3 6 However accurate the Commissioner's
argument on this point may be, Professor Handler's is more
cogent. He reasons that the "incipiency" theory cannot be
used to justify remolding the antitrust laws. The Clayton
and FTC Acts were themselves enacted to curb incipient vio-
lations of the Sherman Act. There can be no incipient viola-
tion of either the Clayton or the FTC Act. It it is reasonably
probable that an express practice will cause harm to compe-
tition the Clayton Act outlaws it.37 Both Tait and Handler
agree that the Commission has created a new substantive
violation of law and, what is more, a per se violation which
precludes consideration of probable anti-competitive effects
of the condemned practice.
From the adverse ruling by the Commission the defendants
carried their cause on appeal to the Second Circuit. In split
decisions, that court upheld the FTC.38 Judge Clark, writing
34. Both Commissioner Tait and Professor Handler base this argument
on the view that Congress enacted Robinson-Patman only after exhaustive
research. The Commissioner wryly notes that the majority's conclusion of
omission through inadvertency is "scarcely" flattering to a Congress
which had the benefit of a lengthy investigation on the subject and showed
itself quite capable of dealing with those who received [2 (c), 2 (f)] insofar
as it felt it should deal with them." See supra n. 16.
35. Professor Handler attempts to reduce the majority's arguments ad
absurdem in a series of interrogatories, suggesting finally that under its
view the "R6binson-Patman Act itself was unnecessary since section 2
of the original Clayton Act dealt generally with the problems of price
discrimination and its frustrating inadequacies could have been tran-
scended by the process of administrative bolstering and supplementation."
Handler supra n. 28, at p. 92.
36. See supra n. 16 28980, at 37,485.
37. Handler supra n. 28, at p. 97. While the "incipiency" doctrine is
one of the less well settled corners of the antitrust law. Professor Oppen-
heim has put the'blame for much of the confusion on Justices Douglas
and Frankfurter in their majority and dissenting opinions in Motion
Picture Advertising v. U. S., supra n. 9. See Oppenheim supra n. 18, at
p. 825 note 13. Of all the incipiency theories propounded, that of Professor
Handler is the most reasonable and coherent.
38. See supra n. 24.
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for the majority, noted (patronizingly) at the outset that the
Commission's decision in Grand Union had caused much stir
in legal periodicals.3 9 He then proceeded to set out the three
elements of the decision. First, Congress did not purposefully
exempt buyers from the proscription of 2(d). Rather, such
practices were declared contrary to the public interest. Since
a seller cannot violate 2 (d) by giving a discriminatory allow-
ance without a buyer receiving that allowance, Congress
did not intend to sanction buyers' indulgence in the unlawful
practice. Second, what the FTC has done in using section 5
to reach buyers has merely been to expand its jurisdiction
"from the technical confines of 2 (d)." The Commission has
not created a new violation of the law. It has fully realized
"the basic policy of the Robinson-Patman Act, which was to
prevent an abuse of buying power.140 The FTC has wholly
within its power as an expert body to declare the defendant's
practice here an unfair method of competition because defend-
ant's activities are "inconsistent with the purpose" of 2 (d).
These activities enabled defendant to better its position at
the expense of its competitors, and Congress has declared this
to be contrary to public policy. 4 1 Third, a violation of 2 (d)
by a seller is an offense per se. The Commission, therefore,
does not have to show a seller's conduct injures competition.
The rule should apply to the buyer violating the "basic policy"
of 2(d) as it does to the seller who violates the letter of the
law.
Since section 5 is used here to reach an integral part
of a violation of section 2(d), and the rationale of the
proceeding is to fulfill the policies of the prohibition, it
would seem an unwarranted amendment of the legislative
scheme to apply a different standard on the question of
39. Judge Clark makes reference to pp. 836-837, 851 of Professor Op-
penheim's article. What he fails to note in that Oppenheim on pp. 839-845
offers a justification for the Grand Union Doctrine which is preferable to
that offered by Judge Clark in the majority opinion. Had the judge, or his
law clerk, read Oppenheim more thoughtfully, perhaps the decision of the
Second Circuit in the instant case would be less open to criticism.
40. See supra n. 24, 70224, at 849.
41. The opinion cites in note 18 Sen. Rep. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1936):
Such an allowance becomes unjust when the service is not rendered as
agreed and paid for, or when, if rendered, the payment is grossly
in excess of its value, or when, in any case the customer is deriving
from it equal benefit to his own business and is thus enabled to shift
to his vendor substantial portions of his own advertising cost, while
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competitive effects to the buyer than it applies to the
seller.
42
In vigorous dissents 43 to both the Grand Union and the
American News decisions 44 Judge Moore attacked the majority
from two logically divergent positions. In his Grand Union dis-
sent, he framed the issue before the court as a contrast in "ju-
dicial philosophies: Whether the law is to be enforced as en-
acted by Congress or whether it is to be enforced as the Com-
mission thinks the law should have been enacted. To remake
the law because of an alleged "inadvertent" omission is to
legislate. Moreover, the omission of buyer liability could
scarcely have been "inadvertent" since the Robinson-Patman
Act followed an exhaustive probe and was expressly de-
signed to "curb the power of the mass buyer." To supply
what Congress omitted is to assume a power which makes
specific antitrust acts "'essentially superfluous' ,,.45 As was
Commissioner Tait, so is Judge Moore concerned with the
per se i ature of this new violation. To create another per se
violation is to fail to construe the Robinson-Patman Act and
section 5 of the FTC Act in harmony with the "broader
antitrust concepts."
In his American News dissent Judge Moore urged that the
buyer-defendant in this case had merely bargained for and
received better terms, and that the majority's holding placed
an intolerable burden on any buyer wanting to so bargain.
The decision
... is a direct mandate to all buyers pursuing their sup-
posed right to bargain for better terms . . .that they
cannot accept such terms as may be agreed upon with-
out analyzing the nature of business of seller's custom-
ers and determining if seller has offered proportionally
equal terms to all. Congress knew this would be vir-
tually impossible for a buyer to ascertain. It is difficult
42. See supra n. 24, 70224, at 75850. Why it is "an unwarranted amend-
ment to the legislative scheme" to put the onus on the FTC to show injury
to competition when it is not "an unwarranted amendment" of the same"legislative scheme" to hold the buyer liable for an action Congress never
expressly outlawed appears nowhere in the opinion.
43. See supra n. 24, 70224, at 75851; 70225, at 75861.
44. The reasoning of the majority in both cases is the same, hence the
two have been treated as one decision.
45. Judge Moore here quoted Handler, Review of Antitrust Develop-
ments, THE RECORD, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Vol. 17,
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enough for a buyer to discover whether a seller is offer-
ing proportionally equal prices to all buyers. For that
reason Congress accorded the buyer with defenses in
2(f). Here, however, the Commission has charged the
buyer with a knowledge much more difficult to ascertain
and has accorded him none of the defenses available
under 2(f). Such a result stifles bargaining competition,
vastly increases the seller's power in a bargaining situa-
tion, and creates laws "which Congress for good reason
has not enacted. 4"
Undeniably the FTC and the Second Circuit have read and
applied 2(d) and section 5 in par/ materia. On the other
hand, none of the dissenters, including the extra-judicial
Professor Handler, has considered the decisions specifically
in the light of pari materia construction. Professor Oppen-
heim has approved of this phase of the FTC ruling. "A
section 5 count may be invoked when the transaction or prac-
tice is equivalent to that within the coverage of the Clayton
Act but a jurisdictional deficiency bars resort to the Clayton
Act. In such instances, the Commission should sustain- the
burden of proving violation in accordance with the statutory
standards and tests of violation applicable to the particular
Clayton Act provision to which the jurisdictional deficiency
is pertinent. '47 Only to the extent that the buyer's practice
is the equivalent of a 2 (d) violation is the Commission safe
in using section- 5 to reach the otherwise exempt buyer. He
shares with Commissioner Tait the trepidation that the lan-
guage "supplement and bolster" used by the Commission is
too strong. Accordingly he urges administrative-judicial re-
straint.48 That this ruling extends the concept of a per se
violation seems also not to trouble him in that the "majority
opinion ... does not appear to open the door to an overall
per se violation approach to section 5.1149
Professor Oppenheim's argument is certainly more reason-
able than either that of the Commission or of the Second
Circuit. Fallacies, however, do appear in it. The concept of
equivalent practices goes back to the Attorney General's
Report. The Committee there recommended that those prac-
46. As in the Grand Union dissent, Judge Moore quotes Professor
Handler with favor and to good effect.
47. Oppenheim supra n. 18, at p. 851.
48. Ibid., at p. 844-845.
49. Ibid., at p. 843.
[Vol. 14
19
et al.: CASE COMMENTS
Published by Scholar Commons,
CASE COMMENTS
tices which were economically equivalent to Robinson-Patman
violations be condemned.50 But this was a part of a fuller
suggestion: to harmonize the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act
and its amendments, and section 5 of the FTC Act, a rule
of reason approach should be taken with regard to 2 (c) -2 (e)
of Robinson-Patman;5 ' the 2(c) and 2(b) defenses should
be infused into those subsections by judicial interpretation
of 2 (d) and 2 (e), legislative amendment of 2 (c) ;52 and the
practices which were economically equivalent of Robinson-
Patman violations should be reached. 53 Putting defenses into
2(c)-2(e) violations and into their economic equivalents was
an integral part of reaching those equivalents. Professor
Oppenheim has eschewed this view for his present position
that the "door" has not been opened to a wider per se appli-
cation and that "congressional amendment is needed if this
per se approach is to be converted into a Rule of Reason
inquiry. . .,.11 As to congressional amendment, Oppenheim
has himself stated that such legislative action is "a forlorn
hope". 55 Rather than a wider application of a per se rule,
what is really to be feared is the depth of its thrust. Antitrust
statutes providing for per se illegality are few, but the cases
prosecuted under those statutes are many. Within Robinson-
Patman the Commission has shwn a comparative abandon in
its use of 2 (e), a per se section, while its use of 2 (a) and
especially 2 (f) is a study in administrative circumspection.1
That Professor Oppenheim is not unaware of these facts of
FTC life tends to abrade the conviction of his arguments.
Nevertheless, it is a sound principle that what is illegal
for a seller to give is illegal for a buyer to receive. The FTC
and the Second Circuit have applied this theory through
50. AG Rep. supra n. 11, at p. 148.
51. Ibid., at pp. 131-132, 196.
52. Ibid., at pp. 192-193.
53. Ibid., at p. 148.
54. Oppenheim, Selected Antitrust Developments, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SEcTION 37, 63 (1959).
55. Ibid, at p. 63.
56. Rowe, supra n. 8, at pp. 303-304. The figures cited by this authority
speak for themselves. "Of the more than 900 Robinson-Patman complaints
issued by the FTC from 1936 to 1960, only 34 have concerned buyers' re-
ceipts under Section 2 (f)." Rowe concludes:
"By a paradox of history, the small merchant, the intended beneficiary
of Congress, became a prime victim of the Robinson-Patman law.
Nearly one half of air Robinson-Patman orders issued by the FTC
until 1957, and about a third of all Robinson-Patman complaints
since, are based on the so-called Brokerage Clause of the Act [2 (c), a
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the medium of section 5. However, there is a distinctly dif-
ferent means by which the same principle could have been
realized without creating a per se violation. Buyers, under
2(f), are forbidden knowingly to receive price discrimina-
tions. The Supreme Court in Automatic Canteen left open
the question whether inducing indirect price discriminations
could be prosecuted under 2(f).57 Upon the premise that
what the defendants in these two cases received were price
discriminations indirectly achieved, the buyers could have
been held in violation of section 2 (f). And upon the premise
that harmony should be struck between the Robinson-Patman
Act and the concepts of reasonability of the Sherman Act,
proceeding under 2(f) is the preferable method to that ac-
tually chosen by the Commission.
The facts in each case show that complying sellers were
making payments to the defendants in the guise of advertis-
ing allowances. In Grand Union, the defendant was receiving
the total payment that one quarter of its suppliers were
making to the advertising agency, and 5% commission on
the remaining payments. To whatever use this money was
put by the buyer, when a seller grants a rebate he has
effectively lowered his price to the recipient. Grand Union
alone among other stores its competing line received this
lower price. Such a practice is outlawed by 2(f). The facts
in American News indicate an even stronger case for apply-
ing 2(f) because, in addition to straight rebates which rep-
resented lower ultimate prices, there was evidence that de-
fendant was using this money to better its competitive posi-
tion in the market by outbidding other newsstand dealers for
choice locations. Certainly, the subsection of the Robinson-
Patman Act that forbids knowing receipt of discriminatory
prices could have been used against these two buyers, and
indeed there is a suggestion that it might in the majority
opinion of the Commission in Grand Union.58 This argument
57. See supra n. 10. Of its interpretation of 2 (f) the Court at footnote
14 of the majority opinion said: "We do not, in so reading 2(f), purport
to pass on the question whether a 'discrimination in price' includes the
prohibitions in such other sections of the Act as §§ 2(d) and 2(e)."
58. See supra n. 16, 28,980 at 37482. The majority opinion quotes
Rep. Utterback from his exposition of 2(f) :
This paragraph makes the buyer liable for knowingly inducing or re-
ceiving any discrimination in price which is unlawful under the first
paragraph of the amendment. That applies both to direct and in-
direct discrimination; and where, for example, there is discrimination
in terms of sale, or in allowances connected or related to the -contract
of sale, of such a character as to constitute or effect an indirect
[Vol. 14
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is implicit in Judge Moore's American News dissent and is
an economically sound view.
The FTC has not found 2 (f) an easy section to work with.
To meet its burden of proof the Commission must show that
the price received is unlawful under 2 (a) and that the buyer
knew the price to be unlawful. Further, the buyer's defenses
must be negatived: that there is injury to competition, that
the price received cannot be cost justified by the seller, and
that the lower price has not been granted in a good faith
effort to meet competition. The very burden the FTC must
meet to show an illegal receipt is, however, a guarantee that
the section would be used with discretion. Moreover, by
according the buyer with these defenses, a per se violation is
avoided. To the extent that per se illegality is at odds with
the Rule of Reason approach, the use of 2(f) creates an
additional harmony between Robinson-Patman and other
anti-trust concepts. This is entirely in keeping with the
spirit of Automatic Canteen and the Attorney General's Re-
port. To reach through the medium of 2(f) buyers who
induce 2(d) violations is to more truly render an in pari
materia construction of the Robinson-Patman Act. While
this is vulnerable, as is the approach the FTC did choose,
to the charge of judicial legislation,60 it alone of the two
theories has the virtue of condemning economically equivalent




discrimination in price, the liability for knowingly inducing or re-
ceiving such discrimination or allowance is clearly provided for
under the later paragraph above referred to. 80 Cong. Rec. 9419
(1936).
The opinion then concludes that this statement "may well be interpreted
to mean that the knowing inducement or receipt of a disproportionate
allowance in violation of section 2(d) . . . is unlawful under Section
2(f).'
59. See supra n. 24.
60. It is interesting to speculate whether Commissioner Tait, Judge
Moore, or Professor Handler would have been quite so strongly concerned
with the creation of a new violation had it been, as suggested here, one
replete with defenses rather than a per se violation.
61. The difficulty of proving a 2(f) charge as opposed to the compara-
tive ease of proving per se illegality is why, one suspects, the FTC chose
the latter course. It is true that the "Congressional road-map of directions
and intended destinations for harmonization of the major antitrust laws
does not compel travel over one statutory road .... Congress allowed for
exploration of new within the Cdmmissio n's delegated authority."
Oppenheim, supra, n. 18 at 854. Nevertheless a new interpretation cre-
ating a per se violation is deplorable not only because such a holding
creates disharmony with the other antitrust laws but because of the
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enthusiasm within which the FTC prosecutes per so violations. Fur-
ther, as Professor Handler wryly notes, "the Commission's approach to
statutory construction is a one-way street," citing Exquisite Form Bras-
siere, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep., p. 29195 at 37589 (Oct. 31, 1960), which
denied that the meeting-competition defense applied in a 2(d) proceeding.
He quotes the Commission:
We cannot supply what Congress has studiously omitted. Since sub-
section 2(b) refers only to a seller's furnishing a service or facility
and since there is nothing in the history of the bill or in the language
of the statute to support respondent's contentions that this provision
may be applied defensively to a charge of violation of Section 2(d)
we must deny to this extent respondent's appeal. Handler, supra, n.
24, at p. 92, n. 105.
While the attitude of the Commission can be understood, if not appreci-
ated, less easy to reconcile is that of the Second Circuit. However, not all
Federal Courts are as easily disposed to constructions of such doubtful
latitude. The Fifth Circuit last year affirmed an FTC order against
automotive parts cooperatives for knowingly receiving discriminatory
prices in violation of 2(f). The coops were, the court conceded, formed to
achieve greater bargaining power to enable the jobber members to compete
with large integrated chain stores, oil companies, and automobile dealers;
Nevertheless, even though the result be to further entrench the larger
competitors, "the result if bad economics or bad social policy, is for Con-
gress to change." Mid-outh Distributors v. FTC, 287 F. 2d 512 (5th Cir.,
1961). Better still, a District Court moved far in the direction of harmony
when it reached the conclusion that the 2(b) defense should be permitted
in a 2(d) case. Delmar Construction Co. of Florida v. Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp., Trade Reg. Rep., p. 69, 946 (S. D. Fla. 1961). The court re-
fused to strike the defense of good faith meeting of competition, saying
that "because of the close inter-relation of § 2(d) and § 2(e) it is both
logical and reasonable to recognize such defenses in cases arising under
§ 2(d)."
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